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SecHelixRuns / REPORT-GOS-2026-09-01
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Release decisionPASSmode LOCAL
Verified findings11 refuted · 2 total
Applicable coverage41of 546 · catalog 2.2
Unknown / blocked90 integrity-critical unknown
SHX-F-GOS-HEADERS-001VERIFIEDMEDIUMconfidence HIGH

Storefront declares no response security headers and can be framed by any origin

All storefront routes served by the Next.js application · CWE-1021, OWASP-ASVS:V14

HypothesisEvidenceVerifyRoot causeFixRegressionRelease
  1. 01
    Attacker control

    An attacker fully controls the third-party page that embeds the storefront.

    established
  2. 02
    Reachability

    Every public route is served without a framing policy, so the embed reaches the real interface.

    established
  3. 03
    Boundary failure

    No frame-ancestors directive and no X-Frame-Options header were emitted, so the browser default of permitting framing applied.

    established
  4. 04
    Safe reproduction

    The storefront rendered inside a cross-origin iframe on a local probe page. No external or production system was contacted.

    established
  5. 05
    Impact

    UI redress: an overlay can bait clicks onto the Sign in and purchase calls to action. Realistic impact is phishing amplification and brand abuse rather than direct account takeover, because this application holds no authenticated state-changing actions.

    established
  6. 06
    Preconditions

    A victim visits an attacker-controlled page while the storefront is publicly reachable.

    established
  7. 07
    Root cause

    next.config.ts declared no headers() policy, so the application never expressed a framing or content-security boundary.

    established
Rejected candidates

What the verifier refused to promote

  1. 01
    SHX-F-GOS-URLSCHEME-001: suspected javascript: cross-site scripting was refuted by local reproduction; React 19 blocks the scheme and no attacker-controlled path to the configuration API was established.
  2. 02
    Buyer-name masking in getRecentSales was reviewed for a privacy leak. Every code path returns a masked value, so no unmasked identifier reaches the page.
Provenance

Tools and redactions

next 16.2.7
Production build under test
vitest 3.2.7
Regression proof execution
chromium-devtools playwright-mcp
Local framing reproduction and CSP refusal capture
curl 8.x
Response header observation
  • No customer data, credentials, secrets, or live exploit material appears in this report.
  • Reproduction used a local mock configuration API; no third-party or production system was contacted.

Blocked checks: SHX-CLOUD-L21